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Who is My Neighbor? Identifying
Epistemic Peers among Polarized
Communities
Alex Hoagland

While philosophers have extensively discussed the problem of disagreement
among epistemic peers, they have generally set aside the question of identifying these
same peers. However, especially in the context of questions of politics and religion,
the labeling of others’ opinions as important or meaningless is particularly relevant.
In such a situation of disagreement, where the correct1 opinion is not immediately
apparent yet has significant moral weight, whose opinions are worth hearing and
under what conditions can we exclude other opinions?
Before beginning a thorough exploration of this topic, I will present some terminology used frequently by philosophers in this conversation.2 A person is considered
your epistemic peer in a subject or issue if, loosely speaking, that person is “as good
as you at evaluating claims [related to the issue]” (Elga 2006). That is, in performing
a complicated mathematical calculation, I would count as an epistemic peer someone who 1) had equivalent mathematical training as I have, 2) had about equivalent
experience performing this type of calculation as I have, and 3) was about as likely as
I was to make mistakes in the course of the calculation. My peer is someone whom,
once I set aside my own reasoning, I think is just as likely as I am to get the “right”
answer to a certain question. A person who is more likely to solve the problem correctly than I am would be my epistemic superior, while one who is less likely to do so
is my epistemic inferior.
The classification of a person as an epistemic peer (or superior or inferior) is issuespecific. While I may be inclined, for example, to see a colleague as an epistemic peer
in mathematical questions, this labeling does not necessarily extend to any other issue.
I would not be under any obligation to classify my graduate advisor as an epistemic
superior in politics or religion, even while I may consider her my superior in our field
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of research. It is therefore possible—even likely—for a person to fill the roles of epistemic
inferior, peer, and superior in relation to another person across a continuum of issues.
The question of epistemic disagreement, then, is as follows: given that I hold an
opinion p about an issue and subsequently discover that someone I consider an epistemic peer holds the opinion ~p, how should I alter 1) my belief or 2) my confidence
in that belief? There are several hypotheses that attempt to answer this question. For
simplicity, I will discuss the two main camps. Those ascribing to the Equal Weight
View (Ibid.) assert that you should give your peer’s conclusion equal weight as your
own—that is, “you should think that the two of you are equally likely to be correct” (Ibid., p. 13). On the other hand, those who deny this view assert that there are
some instances in which it is appropriate, even upon discovering that your peer has
adopted the opinion ~p, to “stick to your guns” and continue to maintain your confidence in your original supposition of p (Schoenfield 2014, p. 3).
Neither of these views, however, gives any indication regarding who qualifies as
an epistemic peer. Therefore, I will take a few steps back in order to answer this question, and then see what this implies about disagreement. This is particularly relevant in
issues that are non-mechanistic. Even when performing a complicated calculation, the
conditions for considering another person my epistemic peer seem relatively obvious.
On the other hand, when discussing the existence of God among a group, there are less
well-defined conditions. In fact, Elga discusses a case similar to this in his exposition of
the Equal Weights View:
Consider Ann and Beth, two friends who stand at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Consider the claim that abortion is morally permissible. Does Ann consider
Beth a peer with respect to this claim? That is: setting aside her own reasoning about
the abortion claim, and Beth’s contrary view about it, does Ann think Beth would be
just as likely as her to get things right? (2006, p. 21).
Elga asserts that the answer to this question is “no,” precisely because “by Ann’s
lights, Beth has reached wrong conclusions about most closely related questions,” such as
“whether human beings have souls, whether it is permissible to withhold treatment from
terminally ill infants, and whether rights figure prominently in a correct ethical theory”
(Ibid., pp. 21–22). Because the two differ on issues that are related to the abortion claim, but
somehow separate from the claim itself, each is unlikely to consider the other as her peer.
Elga follows this with a moral: “with respect to many controversial issues, the associates
who one counts as peers tend to have views that are similar to one’s own” (Ibid., p. 23).
Therefore, when looking specifically at what Elga calls “controversial issues”—but
which I will refer to as non-mechanistic issues3—one potential hypothesis about peer classification is Elga’s claim that we have an obligation to consider someone an epistemic
peer on an issue only if they share our opinions on it. I will refer to this hypothesis as
the community hypothesis, but I will claim that this hypothesis is problematic, especially
among political communities.
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The Problems of Polarization and Independence

Before explaining the theory’s flaws, let us assume it is true. In a world where
epistemic hierarchies are created by this thesis, disagreement among epistemic peers is
vacuously avoided (except in mechanistic cases)—I will never disagree with someone I
consider my epistemic peer. My opinion on an issue will be altered only by interactions
with epistemic superiors who hold opinions different from my own,4 in which case, I
will adopt theirs. Recall that an epistemic superior is more likely to arrive at the correct
conclusion than you are, this is a desirable result.
However, there is inconsistency in assuming the existence of epistemic superiors
with competing opinions in a system that excludes them from being your peer. Under
Elga’s view, Ann was not Beth’s epistemic peer, precisely because Beth could judge—on
the basis of fringe issues—that Ann had frequently come to the “wrong” conclusion. Beth
would thus consider Ann her epistemic inferior, rather than the other way around.
Under the community hypothesis, then, an agent either holds the same views as
you do or is your epistemic inferior, in which case you have no reason to regard their
opinion as even remotely valuable. With no reason to bend on any non-mechanistic
issues, disagreement then amounts to nothing except angry Facebook posts. This seems
to undermine an important function of disagreement, as implied in both Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem and the Median Voter Theorem: that of generating consensus. The community
hypothesis allows individuals to reinforce their own convictions with self-selected epistemic peers while simultaneously removing themselves from their opponents, eliminating the need for compromise altogether. This is the problem of polarization.
Other critiques of this hypothesis seem compelling.5 Consider one central problem in the abortion scenario: When Ann judges Beth based on her opinions on closely
related issues, she is judging Beth inferior on claims that 1) are not fully separable from
the issue at hand and 2) are not verifiable; therefore, they are not evidence of Beth’s
incompetence or irrationality. When considering non-mechanistic issues, such as politics, people tend to form opinions consistent across issues in order to minimize cognitive dissonance.6 Therefore, judging someone an epistemic peer (which asserts that
independent of your reasoning, a colleague is as likely to come to the right conclusion as
you are) requires you to set aside these ideologies and examine only traits, such as the
ability to think critically and rationally. By asserting that these “clusters of controversy”
determine an epistemic hierarchy, Elga asserts that disagreement implies inferiority
(Ibid, p. 23).
One potential rejection of the community hypothesis is that we have no special obligation to consider anyone an epistemic peer—call this the stand-alone hypothesis. Yet this
too is problematic. After all, it does seem right to conclude that a person who shares your
view on an issue and has no external qualifications for superiority or inferiority should
be considered your epistemic peer. Under these conditions, considering her a superior
would be to invalidate the independence of your opinion forming, while considering
her an inferior would be to invalidate hers. The stand-alone hypothesis thus seems to
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violate some core of individual opinion forming by not calling a duck a duck. Call this the
problem of independence—without some obligation to view members of a like-minded
community peers, these communities devolve into bandwagons.

Peer Classification Outside of Like-Minded Groups: The Conversation Hypothesis

As an alternative to both the community and stand-alone hypotheses, I propose a
middle ground: While we ought to consider those sharing our views as epistemic peers,7
there additionally exist circumstances under which we are obligated to consider those
outside of our like-minded communities as epistemic peers. My argument for this claim—
call it the conversation hypothesis—is summarized here:
1. Agent A considers agent B her epistemic inferior if and only if A is more
likely to reach the correct solution to I than is B. A similar definition holds
for epistemic superior.
2. With regard to an issue I, any agent must consider other agents either her epistemic inferior, superior, or peer.
3. An issue I is considered non-mechanistic or controversial if a third party possessing
the sum total of mankind’s knowledge could not assess the correct response to I.
4. A is more likely to reach the correct answer on an issue I if and only if A has better training, experience, evidence, or history8 than B.
5. When I is non-mechanistic, training and experience are irrelevant in determining
the likelihood that an agent will reach a correct conclusion. Similarly, a nonmechanistic I prohibits there being any history of correctness.
6. Therefore, if agents A and B share the same evidence E on a non-mechanistic
issue I, it is neither the case that B is an epistemic inferior to A, nor that A is an
epistemic inferior to B.
7. Thus, when two agents share the same body of evidence on a non-mechanistic
issue I, they are epistemic peers.
Premises 1–3 are definitional, and I take them as assumptions. Notice that the first is
simply a restatement of the definitions of superiority or inferiority as used by a wide base
of the philosophy of disagreement literature (e.g., Elga 2006 and Shoenfield 2014, among
others). The second statement provides a complete framework for the binary relation of
“epistemological knowledge” and follows immediately from the first definition. If I take
any other person and any issue I, that person is either more likely, less likely, or equally as
likely as I am to reach the correct solution to I. Therefore, that person must be exactly my
epistemic superior, inferior, or peer.
Premise 3 restricts our attention to the class of issues relevant to our discussion,
making it the most important definition. It is important to note that we are not considering issues that have no solution, but those that have no evidence-based or mechanistic
solutions. In general, these issues fall into two classes: moral issues and unanswered
questions. Elga’s abortion case is an excellent example of the first class, as the legality of
abortion depends almost entirely on the respective moral weights placed on a person’s
86

HOAGLAND
freedom to choose and another person’s right to life.9 It may well be the case that, objectively, the freedom to choose ought to be given more moral weight than a person’s freedom to life, or it may be that no such objective ranking of moral weights exists. In either
case, no amount of knowledge or experience can equip a person to come to a foolproof
awareness of their existence or nonexistence, so the issue is non-mechanistic. Similarly,
some questions have objective answers that reside outside our current scope of knowledge; it is objectively true either that God exists or that he does not (but not both), but
completely impossible for any person to provide a proof of either result, even if that
person had access to the complete ken of human knowledge or experience. The class
of non-mechanistic issues, then, represents a wide swath of issues, including (among
other issues) important political questions related to same-sex marriage or the treatment of refugees. In a later section of this paper dedicated to responding to objections, I
will further refine this definition to classify exactly which moral questions belong in the
world of non-mechanistic issues.
Premise 4 is a collection of all possible ways one agent could label another as either
superior or inferior to them on an issue; I have chosen these categories from the relevant
literature on disagreement. No other categories appear to be relevant in determining
the likelihood of arriving at the correct response to an issue. While there are some objections (e.g., B may have access to an epistemic superior in the issue to whom A does
not, etc.), these can be handled readily by absorbing them into one of the categories
(for example, access to a knowledgeable source on I could be considered part of the
evidence E).
Premise 5 is the heart of the argument. Specifically, it asserts that in the class of
non-mechanistic issues to which I have restricted my attention, only evidence can create an epistemic hierarchy. As this is the most important premise in the argument, I will
attempt to present a thorough justification for its use. First, consider the roles of training
and experience, which are common heuristics in assigning another individual to the
role of epistemic superior or inferior. However, I claim that in the case of non-mechanistic issues, this reduces to a fallacious appeal to a false authority. Because a specific
issue, say the morality of abortion or the existence of God, is non-mechanistic, there is
no system of reasoning or training that has yielded a resolution to the issue. In such a
scenario, distinguishing between differences in training or experience is impossible.
Who is to say that a nurse who has performed hundreds of abortions is more or less
likely to understand the correct moral weights assigned to an abortion than a professor
of ethics, or that a physicist is more or less likely to be correct on the existence of God
than a priest? Neither the training nor the life experience of any of these four occupations can be considered comparable, but there does not exist a clear way to assert dominance of one over the other. Furthermore, given that no clear path to resolution exists, it
is not clear that years of experience or prestige of training would matter in assigning
value to a person’s opinion. If physics is not a confirmed path to understanding the
existence of God, why should Stephen Hawking have any more moral authority on
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the issue than a peruser of A Brief History of Time? For that matter, why should he have
any more authority than a layman with no knowledge of physics whatsoever? Once the
issue arises, it is self-perpetuating, and backward induction asserts that it is invalid in
any potential comparison based on training or experience.
Second, consider the role of history in examining a non-mechanistic issue. Suppose
that there was a history of correctness with regard to such an issue—were this the case,
it would be included in the sum total of man’s knowledge, and, therefore, reduced to a
mechanistic issue, as a correct solution is known and accessible. Therefore, the second
half of the premise follows merely from the definition of a non-mechanistic issue.
If, then, there are no other criteria by which a person can be labeled an epistemic
inferior on some class of issues except through evidence, it follows that two agents who
share the same body of evidence each ought to consider the other as their epistemic peer.
Notice that this argument solves both the problems of polarization and independence: If
these claims are true, and an agent outside of our community has the same evidence we
do (even though he has reached a different conclusion), we still ought to consider him
our peer. Similarly, those in our like-minded communities (that share evidences as one of
their principal functions) will be considered our peers. Additionally, this argument has
several critical implications, which I will explore in the subsequent section.

Application of the Conversation Hypothesis to Disagreement

Up to this point, I have been vague about the definition of the “correct” answer to an
issue, especially non-mechanistic issues, for which the notion of correctness seems particularly obscure. Notice, however, that one implication of this argument is that the Equal
Weights View leads to absurdity. Consider the case of Ann and Beth once more. Assuming, as Elga does, that Ann and Beth have had a lengthy conversation in which each has
shared her views and evidences, there is no other criterion to separate Ann and Beth
from peer ship. Yet the two have staunchly opposed opinions on the same issue and
(at least, after the discussion) evidence that there is no intuition suggesting either will be
dissuaded from her view.10 Were the Equal Weights View legitimate, each would have to
judge the other as equally likely to arrive at the correct conclusion, a process that would
force both parties into agnosticism about the issue of abortion. Thus, the Equal Weights
View, at least for non-mechanistic issues, for which hierarchy is impossible to form except
by evidence, seems to imply widespread skepticism about the murkier moral questions.
Many could argue—and indeed, have done so—that these are precisely the questions that need to be answered the most. Indeed, almost every question on political
policy can be reduced to a complicated question of balancing moral values.11 Given
that political policy questions (among others) require implementable solutions, skepticism is an undesirable goal. Therefore, it is unavoidable in non-mechanistic issues under
the Equal Weights View that situations exist when it is rational to stick to one’s original
opinion even in the face of an epistemic peer who disagrees with you. This is precisely
the hypothesis of Steadfastness. Additionally, this seems to imply12 a form of Working Permissivism. That is, even if non-mechanistic issues have unique, correct solutions (and the
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questions of existence and uniqueness are a matter for another paper entirely), it is not
irrational for two agents to share a body of evidence and reach different conclusions. I
will discuss important applications of this result in a later section. This result is interesting
for two principal reasons, depending on the type of non-mechanistic issue at hand: For
moral issues, it asserts that policy ought not to be based on unanimity, while for unanswered questions, it maximizes the chance of reaching a solution by jointly expanding the
base of evidence. A multiplicity of unchanging viewpoints may lead to policy inefficiencies—it may be the case, for instance, that our policies around abortion cycle depending
on fluctuations in a nation’s majority opinion. However, allowing for this variability creates a space for educated conversation amidst the noise of impossible conversion. For
moral issues, whose solutions are usually not theoretically attainable given any amount
of experimentation or knowledge, working permissivism yields an important implication in political conversation and policy: listening with compassion. For unanswered
questions, this is just as important but for a different reason. Allowing for the priest and
the physicist to share information while preserving their own views is critical for interdisciplinary studies and the pursuit of further knowledge. Given that no path of training is
more viable than another, allowing each to follow their own candidate path while learning from the triumphs and pitfalls of others increases the chance of success.

Response to Objections: Moral Absolutes and Subjective Evidence

I can see a few potential objections to this argument. The first major objection
is empirical and rests on the apparent preponderance of unacceptable responses to
non-mechanistic issues. Consider, for example, the issue of female infanticide and its
proponents—should not the conversation hypothesis allow agents who hold morally
repulsive views as epistemic inferiors? This objection can take two forms. The first is
a mere rephrasing of the community hypothesis with the question: Is there a threshold level of ideological difference after which I can label an agent my epistemic inferior? The second is a more puzzling question: Is there an objectively identifiable set of
opinions that are unacceptable on moral grounds?13 The answer to the first question
is an easy “no”; the epistemic hierarchy cannot be determined based on the distance
between opinions but must be based on the likelihood of correctness. To do anything
else would be to assert superiority in experience, training, or history, none of which is
valid in answering a non-mechanistic question. On the other hand, the second question is a more difficult one; to examine it further, I will formalize it. Two agents—A and
B—disagree on the issue of whether it is morally permissible to murder female infants
but share the same evidence E on the issue. If agent B believes that female infanticide is
acceptable, is agent A justified in labeling him an epistemic inferior?
It may seem immediately apparent that all issues of morality must be non-mechanistic; it appears that any arbiter possessing the totality of human knowledge would
be unable to answer correctly any moral question. However, this seems too hasty. For
example, it would appear to many that such an arbiter would clearly be able to identify
the objectionable nature of murder and could decisively state that murder is morally
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impermissible through an appeal to the human experience. If this is the case, then the
objection can be rectified by revising premise 3 to say:
3. Agent A considers agent B her epistemic inferior if and only if A is more likely
to reach the correct solution to I than is B, or if B has an opinion that requires the
violation of a mechanistic moral question (such as the legitimacy of murder).
This revision of premise 3 is also desirable in order to address a similar but perhaps
more general objection: one of extreme moral relativism. If we consider any moral issue
non-mechanistic, then any response to the current body of evidence is a viable one and
policy reflects merely the whims of the majority, whatever they may be. While I do not
wish to make any normative claims regarding theories of moral relativism, interpretations of the conversation hypothesis that reduce the illegality of murder to merely the
fact that more than 50 percent of the population favor not murdering others seems
dubious. It may seem that in some instances, moral questions can be answered by
enough human experience or experimentation—in such cases, the conversation would
not apply, because a moral hierarchy could be built around experience and training,
meaning that we need not be permissive about certain ideas, such as murder.
In order to respond fully to this criticism, then, we must address the question:
When can a moral issue safely be considered mechanistic, and when can it not? It is
likely that this is a question for future responses to the conversation hypothesis and the
questions of political disagreement in general. However, I will offer an initial pass at
an answer. Recall that a mechanistic issue is answered correctly by examining the complete body of evidence of human experience. We can similarly define a morally mechanistic issue as a moral issue that is answered easily by the application of a specific view of
morality, such as utilitarianism or the categorical imperative. This is essentially equivalent of reducing moral issues to simple and compound issues; many (if not all) theories
of normative ethics would conclude that murder is morally impermissible in the black
and white, making murder a morally mechanistic issue. In fact, on simple moral issues,
generally acclaimed theories of normative ethics tend to agree, making it almost natural to conclude that the question can be (at least very closely) determined. When context compounds the issues is when these theories diverge. Hence, when a moral issue
becomes more non-mechanistic, for example, the “simple” question of murder can be
generalized to the “compound” cases of abortion or the question of Jim and the Indians
(Smart and Williams 1973). Given that different theories will reach different answers,
the arguments above detailing the pitfalls of appealing to experience or training apply,
making the issue more non-mechanistic.
A third and final critique lies in my (perhaps) flippant discussion of the evidence
surrounding an issue. What exactly constitutes this evidence? Consider, as an example,
the case of a jury in a criminal trial; while each juror receives the same evidence provided in the courtroom, might not previous life experiences alter the way evidence is
perceived? In this sense, is it ever possible to share evidence completely?
This is exactly the type of problem that the community hypothesis was built to
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address. Previous philosophers have relied on arguments such as this to advocate for
uniqueness in the face of the empirical evidence of frequently divided juries. However, if we define evidence as strictly objective and tangible (e.g., the testimonies of
the witnesses and arguments of the attorneys), the community hypothesis requires
no raised eyebrows at the existence of a non-unanimous verdict. While it is true that
subjective perception of evidence leads to differing views, this subjectivity is not a
problem for non-mechanistic issues.14 Even among differing perceptions, peer ship
is not forfeited.

Applications and Conclusion

Therefore, while we may be under more obligation to view others as our epistemic peers than perhaps previously assumed, we are under less obligation to suspend our own beliefs in order to accommodate disagreement. This result has direct
applications to almost any area of interest in the domain of political science, as political
activities and behavior are inevitably built on discussion of non-mechanistic issues,
such as abortion. In fact, current research in political science empirically substantiates
the use of the conversation hypothesis by people utilizing social media sources such
as Facebook and Twitter. For example, Kim, Hsu, and de Zuniga (2013) use Facebook
network data in the U.S. to conclude that political posts on Facebook contribute to an
increased level of “heterogeneity in discussion networks,” or an increased likelihood
that a political participant will engage in conversation with other political participants from across the political spectrum.15 In general, the authors find these increased
conversations from “across the aisle” lead to an increase in civic engagement.
One important gap in this research, however, is an examination of the results
of such cross-partisan discussions. Specifically, current political science research has
been silent on the ways these conversations affect the initial opinions of their participants. Future researchers may focus on analyzing these political conversations
in a setting that allows them to determine whether the conversation 1) brought the
participants to a “middle ground” solution, as predicted by the Median Voter Theorem; 2) polarized the participants even more, as suggested by either the community
hypothesis or the stand-alone hypothesis; or 3) encouraged a socially beneficial conversation without shifting each agent’s own political opinions, as predicted by the
conversation hypothesis. This research would have important political implications
on fostering political discussion among heterogeneous groups and answer questions such as ideological selectivity in social media use (Iyengar and Hahn 2009).
Once established, these results extend to almost any aspect of political science that
relies on political dialogue about non-mechanistic issues, such as policy formation,
political economy, and international relations.
On issues the collective human spirit has not adequately addressed, we have no
sufficient criteria for distinguishing epistemic superiority and, therefore, cannot close
our ears or minds to the arguments of those who have reached different conclusions
than us. However, this does not need to lead to widespread skepticism or the sur91
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rendering of belief. Rather, the exposure to different views on the same evidence can
have a purely positive impact on discussion and embodiment overall. As Nietzsche
wrote, “let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives . . . to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no
small discipline and [serves] . . . so that one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge” (On the
Genealogy of Morality, III.12).
NOTES
1. I recognize that for many of the issues discussed in this paper, the use of the word “correct” to
describe a solution to the issue may seem vague. Over the course of the paper, I hope to clarify
this sentiment.
2. These definitions appear in broad strokes—there are many variations on a theme when it comes
to the semantics of the debate. However, in order to focus on the more critical issues, I will
attempt to use definitions that appeal to many philosophers’ views.
3. As a pass at a definition of these types of issues (which I think synthesizes the views of philosophers such as Elga who have written on the subject), I assert that an issue is non-mechanistic if
it is impossible to amass a body of evidence E large enough to arrive at a unique answer to the
question being considered. According to another way of thinking, an issue could be considered
mechanistic if we could reasonably conceive of a computer or robot possessing the sum total of
humanity’s knowledge answering the question for us, thereby eliminating the need to handle
disagreement stemming from human error. I will clarify this definition further in the next section of the paper.
4. We can assume, for the purposes of this paper, that the discovery that an epistemic superior
holds an opinion contradictory to your own is strong enough evidence for you to change your
opinion. Whether this is true is a matter for another paper.
5. For one thing, it seems to be begging the question by arguing that a label of epistemic peer is
conditional on minimizing disagreement.
6. The validity of this claim is questioned by some, who maintain that we merely think that we do
this when, in fact, our opinions are quite inconsistent. While this may be true, it is the very perception of opinion-forming that I am concerned with, and so this objection is an irrelevant one.
7. Unless some obvious condition exists, which labels one of us as superior.
8. i.e., a better history of being correct on issues similar to (or exactly identical to, in the case of
mechanistic issues).
9. This is a broad-strokes portrayal of the issue in order to avoid a larger tangent.
10. Even Elga avoids claiming this, as the bulk of human interaction would suggest the opposite.
11. As in the case of abortion, in which different opinions arise from assigning different preferences
to the values of freedom and the right to life.
12. Although the argument for this conclusion would take substantially more work.
13. An even more basic question may arise concerning the labelling of any view as morally
repulsive within the domain of a non-mechanistic issue. Here, we must remember that nonmechanistic issues are not unsolvable ones—opinions held by agents assessing a body of
evidence are considered candidate solutions to an issue, and one agent’s candidate solution
may be viewed as repugnant or extremely off-base by another agent. Specifically, a view may
be repulsive because of its implications for other, more mechanistic issues, rather than its contrast to the true solution (which is inaccessible for these questions). For example, within the
question of abortion’s morality, it may be the case that a particular agent holds that children
hold no rights at all until they are able to contribute to society, thereby condoning not only
abortion but also other forms of child abuse (such as female infanticide). This candidate solution would be viewed as morally repulsive by many, even though there is no true solution
with which to compare the idea.
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14. Indeed, no standard of objectivity exists.
15. This article also includes important references to other studies attempting to understand the
role of political conversation on social media sites in elevating offline political participation, and
the role of different personal characteristics in mitigating these results.
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